Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
O ne aspect of the federal personal income tax system that has been widely regarded as unfair, by legislators from both sides of the aisle, is the so-called "marriage penalty" or "marriage tax." A marriage penalty or tax occurs when the combined tax liabilities of two individuals are higher if they marry than if they remain single (with no other changes in behavior that would affect income).
1 There was a flurry of legislative activity in the 106 th Congress surrounding marriage tax relief, although no bills were successfully shepherded to enactment. The 107 th Congress opened with an equal amount of energy directed toward eliminating, or at least alleviating, the burden of the marriage penalty. This emphasis was given executive approval in the Bush Administration's tax plan, "The President's Agenda for Tax Relief" (White House, 2001 ). George W. Bush campaigned for president on a platform that put strong emphasis on the need for income tax relief, a message targeted in particular at Tax Reductions, Tax Changes, and the Marriage Penalty
American families. President Bush moved quickly upon assuming office to propose a tax reduction with central components aimed at two broad goals: increasing tax fairness while preserving economic prosperity. A major part of the Bush tax plan is reducing the tax liability faced by families, especially reducing the marriage penalty.
The existence of the marriage penalty is not a deliberate act of lawmakers' hostility toward marriage, but rather arises because of the pursuit of other tax priorities. As a society, we have chosen to impose the individual income tax on family (rather than individual) income, in order to achieve horizontal equity across families. We have also chosen to impose the income tax at progressive (rather than proportional) tax rates, in order to achieve vertical equity across individuals. Such a tax system will necessarily fail to achieve "marriage neutrality"; that is, there is potential for a couple's income tax liability to change with marriage. We have therefore made the decision to accept the existence of a marriage penalty (or marriage subsidy) in order to seek more closely our notions of horizontal and vertical equity. In fact, it is possible to design an individual income tax in which taxes do not change with marriage. However, doing so requires us to face trade-offs across different goals of taxation. Also, doing so is more complicated than is commonly understood.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the nature of some of the complications that may arise in efforts to reduce the marriage penalty. In particular, the Bush Administration proposes to provide substantial tax relief for families and, at the same time, to achieve a reduction in the marriage penalty. Three major familytargeted features of the Bush tax plan are:
• reducing and simplifying marginal tax rates; • doubling the child tax credit (and applying the credit to the Alternative Minimum Tax); and • reinstating a two-earner deduction. 2 We explore the impact of these features of the Bush tax plan on the relative tax liabilities of different types of American families, in an attempt to gauge whether the plan does in fact reduce the marriage penalty across many types of taxpaying family units. Our calculations indicate that it is certainly feasible to reduce the marriage penalty. However, our calculations also indicate that achieving this goal can be a difficult task, with tax reductions and other tax changes sometimes having unintended and unanticipated effects. In particular, the Bush tax plan does not eliminate the marriage tax, and in some cases actually makes the marriage penalty even larger than it is at present. This seemingly perverse effect can occur because the plan reduces the tax liability for all households but sometimes reduces it more for single than for married households. Because the marriage penalty reflects the differential tax treatment of married versus single households, a tax plan that gives larger reductions to single individuals can actually increase the marriage penalty. In short, reducing marriage penalties is not as simple as reducing income taxes.
In the following sections we discuss the marriage penalty and the tax changes proposed by the Bush Administration, analyze the impact of the changes on the tax liability of families at different income levels and with different structures, and conclude with some observations on the difficulties of achieving marriage neutrality in the income tax.
MARRIAGE PENALTIES AND THE BUSH TAX PLAN
A number of reasons for tax reduction have been offered recently: to counter an economic slowdown, to encourage economic growth, to reduce the size of government, to provide tax relief, and the like. Of almost equal importance to many policy makers has been the eliminationor at least the reduction-of the marriage penalty.
The marriage penalty is widely misunderstood, in part because it is not a statutory item in the tax code but rather arises from other provisions of the tax law. It can also be somewhat tricky to calculate because it hinges on assumptions made about married couples were they not married, or singles were they to marry (Feenberg and Rosen, 1995; Alm and Whittington, 1996) . A common approach is to construct hypothetical, or "representative," taxpayers and then simply to assess their tax burdens as single versus as married taxpayers (Brozovsky and Cataldo, 1994) . Although generalizing beyond these constructed taxpayers is difficult, this approach offers a useful snapshot of how proposed changes in the tax law differentially affect taxpayers. Another approach examines an "average" taxpayer, based on aggregate information (Alm and Whittington, 1996; Sjoquist and Walker, 1995) . However, detailed information on many relevant tax characteristics is not available, and averages necessarily miss much variation across family types. Perhaps the most systematic approach examines the actual tax return (or other information) of a sample of married taxpayers, and compares the couple's taxes as married with their combined taxes if the individuals were (hypothetically) to divorce (Rosen, 1987) . Although the married tax liability is determined from the couple's tax return or other sources of information, the tax liabilities as singles depend upon the precise way in which exemptions, deductions, and incomes are allocated between the two individuals in the event of the hypothetical divorce, as well as upon the tax schedule the individuals use. As noted by Feenberg and Rosen (1995) and Alm and Whittington (1996) , there are a number of reasonable approaches for making these allocations.
Regardless of the precise method that is actually used, there is little doubt that a large number of U.S. taxpayers incur a nontrivial marriage penalty. Alm and Whittington (1996) estimate that about 60 percent of married couples pay on average nearly $1,400 more in taxes as a married couple than they would pay as singles; the Congressional Budget Office (1997) estimates a lower but still substantial 42 percent of married couples face a marriage penalty. Less well recognized is the fact that a very large number of U.S. couples receive a marriage subsidy because their combined tax liabilities fall with marriage. The Congressional Budget Office (1997) estimates that over one-half of all married couples are subsidized by the individual income tax, while Alm and Whittington (1996) estimate that a somewhat lower proportion, roughly one-third of married families, receive a marriage subsidy that averages over $1,000 per couple.
The incidence of the marriage tax is not strewn randomly throughout the taxpaying population. In general, families more likely to face a marriage penalty include those who have children, who are older, and who are white. Importantly, twoearner couples pay a much greater penalty than single-earner couples; in fact, single-earner couples almost always receive a marriage subsidy. The marriage penalty on two-earner households tends to rise in absolute value the more similar are the earnings of the couple because the combined income of two similar-earning individuals pushes them into higher tax brackets while a couple with dissimilar earnings moves into lower tax brackets as a result of marriage. The marriage penalty also tends to increase with the size of a couple's earnings; however, there is a very severe potential marriage penalty at the low end of the income distribution because two low-income individuals with dependents might be pushed out of the eligible range of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) if they marry and combine their incomes.
The Bush Administration has built into its tax proposal two features that, it is claimed, will provide direct marriage tax relief: the reinstitution of a second earner (or two-earner) deduction and a reduction of marginal tax rates.
The second earner deduction was part of the Reagan tax cut of 1981, but was abolished five years later by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. A second earner deduction allows married taxpayers to deduct a portion of the earnings of the lower-earning spouse from their adjusted gross income, thereby lowering their taxable income and their subsequent tax liability. Because it is a feature that is available only to twoearner married couples, the second earner deduction necessarily reduces the tax liability of married families relative to single taxpayers. The Bush tax plan calls for a 10 percent tax deduction on the earnings of the lower-earning spouse up to earnings of $30,000, for a maximum deduction of $3,000.
Reducing marginal tax rates can also lower the marriage tax because this reduces the progressivity of the tax structure, which is one major cause of the penalty. As shown in Table 1 , the Bush tax plan collapses the existing five tax brackets for married joint-filing families to four, and reduces the thresholds for the lowest and the top brackets; the proposal contains the same sweeping changes for single and head-of-household filers, though the income brackets are different for these types of filers than for married couples filing joint returns. The Bush tax proposal shifts those at the very bottom of the income distribution in all filing categories from a 15 percent marginal tax rate to a new 10 percent rate. The married bracket at the lowest proposed rate is double that of the single bracket, and 20 percent larger than the bracket for head-of-household filers. The proposal calls for the remainder of taxpayers in the current 15 percent tax bracket to remain at that level. The current 28 and 31 percent brackets are folded together for all types of taxpayers to make one large 25 percent tax bracket; for example, married-joint filers with taxable income in the range of $45,200 to $166,500 would all face a 25 percent statutory tax rate, and the 25 percent bracket also applies to single filers with taxable income in the range $27,050 to $136,750 and to head-of-household filers in the range $36,250 to $151,650. Currently, there are 36 and 39.6 percent tax brackets for higher incomes, and these are collapsed into a single bracket with the lower statutory tax rate of 33 percent. Overall, it is estimated that the Bush tax plan will reduce income taxes by well over $1 trillion over the next decade. Of course, any plan that is actually passed into law is likely to differ in various ways from the proposed tax plan of the Administration. However, recall that the marriage penalty (or marriage subsidy) arises because of the differential tax treatment of married and single households. Thus, while it is clear that the Bush tax plan will reduce the absolute value of tax liabilities for all households, it is not immediately obvious that the changes in the tax structure proposed by the Administration will actually reduce the marriage penalty. Shifting the tax structure in a parallel fashion for all groups gives the impression that the relative position of these groups is unchanged. However, this is a misconception. Consider two single taxpayers with no dependents, and assume that one has adjusted gross income (AGI) of $60,000 and files taxes using the standard deduction, while the other person has no income (Table 2) . Under current law, the individual with no income would have no tax liability and would also receive no tax credit, and the individual who earns $60,000 would face a federal personal income tax liability of $11,197, for an average tax rate of 18.66 percent. Under the Bush plan, the tax liability of the zero earner would remain unchanged. However, the tax liability on the earner would decline to $10,132. The average tax rate on the earner would therefore fall by 1.77 percentage points to 16.89 percent, which represents a decline of 9.5 percent.
Contrast this with the change in tax liability for a married couple filing jointly with identical AGI, a single earner, no dependents, and the standard deduction. This couple has taxable income of $46,600, which would generate a tax liability of $7,172 under the current regime and $6,530 under the Bush tax plan. The effective tax rate would fall from 11.95 to 10.88 percent, a reduction of 1.07 percentage points (or 8.9 percent). Relative to their taxes as single individuals, a single-earner married couple would receive a marriage subsidy under both the current regime and the Bush plan. The married couple enjoys a marriage subsidy equal to $4,025 (or the difference between $7,172 and $11,197) under the current tax structure, and $3,602 under the Bush tax plan.
Note, however, that the percentage change in the tax burden of the single individual is actually larger than that of the married couple, which implies that the relative tax status of single individuals at this income level actually improves when contrasted with married couples. In fact, the Bush plan actually reduces the marriage subsidy by $423, due to the narrowing of the tax differential between equal income single and married filers; that is, although the Bush tax plan lowers the liabilities of both singles and married couples, the plan lowers taxes more for singles than for married couples and thereby reduces the relative tax benefits of married couples. This outcome is not unique to one income level or to single-earner married couples, although it is most likely largest for this group in part because they do not benefit from the reinstated second earner deduction. However, there are also couples who would experience a reduction in their marriage penalty, meaning that the tax differential between single and married filers would increase. If, for example, the married couple were made up of two earners, each with AGI of $30,000, then they would be allowed to reduce their taxable income by an additional $3,000 from the second earner deduction. This couple would move from facing a marriage penalty to receiving a marriage subsidy, as demonstrated in Table 2 .
Of course, many other outcomes are possible. Also shown in Table 2 is a case in which a couple experiences an increase in the marriage tax, even though the couple's absolute income tax burden as a married couple actually declines. Again, this outcome happens because there is a larger decline in their income taxes as singles than as a married couple.
What is immediately clear is that despite rhetoric claiming that the proposed tax plan will "greatly reduce the marriage penalty" (The White House, 2001, p. 4) , it is likely that the tax plan decreases the marriage subsidy for some couples, lowers the marriage penalty for others, and actually increases the marriage penalty for still other couples.
The third tax feature of the Administration's tax proposal that will clearly influence the tax liability of American families is the doubling of the child tax credit from $500 to $1,000. Strictly speaking, this feature does not provide direct marriage tax relief. However, the marriage penalty is quite pronounced for families with children because the gap between married tax brackets and head of household brackets is much smaller than between married and single brackets, and also because the EITC is phased out as income levels rise, as discussed previously (Alm and Whittington, 1996) . Unlike the EITC, however, the child tax credit is not refundable. The result is that this enhanced tax feature will tend to benefit middle-and high-income families more often than it will assist low-income households who have little or no tax liability. Note that the Bush tax plan leaves the EITC unchanged.
COMPARING THE BUSH TAX PROPOSAL WITH CURRENT TAX LAW
In order to assess the broad impact of the Bush tax plan on a variety of family types and income levels, we calculate simple 2001 federal personal income tax burdens assuming that all filers take the standard deduction and the appropriate number of personal and dependent exemptions. We incorporate the EITC and the child tax credit where appropriate. We also allocate the income in different ways across the partners to test the impact of earnings distribution on relative tax liability. The results are presented in Figures 1 to 7.
The tax structure maintains its same basic shape after the Bush changes as under the current tax law, with total tax liability falling at very low income levels, then rising progressively over income. At all levels of income, single taxpayers bear the highest tax liability, and married couples with children bear the lowest. Head-of-household filers bear a higher tax burden than married couples with children.
The Bush tax plan does in fact generate sweeping tax reductions across the income scales. The absolute dollar amount of the reduction tends to climb with income. The reduction in taxes as a proportion of income is also generally higher for higher income taxpayers, as demonstrated in Figure 1 . There is a significant increase in the change in tax liability as a percentage of income up to about $30,000 of AGI for married and head-of-household filers; the climb peaks at about $12,000 for single taxpayers. The change in liability relative to income then falls, but generally plateaus and climbs again with income, leveling off at roughly 4 percent of income at AGI levels greater than $200,000. The fact that the tax reduction is larger as a percent of income at higher AGI levels has generated much of the political controversy about the Bush tax plan.
3
The Bush Administration has never claimed that its plan either would eliminate the marriage penalty or would achieve marriage neutrality. It is therefore unsurprising that nonneutralities with respect to marriage would continue to exist under its tax plan, as shown in Figures 2 and 3 . In order to demonstrate the existence and magnitude of the marriage penalty or marriage subsidy, we illustrate three possible income distributions with a married couple: 2 earners with equal income, a single earner, and two earners with a 75/25 percent income split between the partners. With identical income and other characteristics, each of these couples would have an identical tax liability as a married couple. However, because their tax liability relative to comparable unmarried single individuals is different, each of these couples would face a different marriage penalty/subsidy. In Figure 2 , we examine only couples with no children, so as to avoid confounding the marriage penalty with the treatment of children. For example, if a couple has a single earner, the couple is compared with a single person earning identical income; a couple with two equal earners is compared to two single taxpayers who each make the same amount and whose combined earnings are identical to the married couple; and the married couple with an AGI split of 75/25 percent is contrasted with two single earners who make 75 and 25 percent of the total couple's income, respectively, and whose combined income is identical to that of the married couple. In Figure 3 , we examine couples with children, using similar comparisons.
The pattern that emerges in Figure 2 is a familiar one. Married families with a single earner enjoy a substantial tax advantage over comparable single taxpayers. On the other hand, couples with two equal earners pay a marriage tax at most low-income levels and consistently at middle-to high-incomes. Two-earner couples with an uneven distribution of income are intermediate to these two categories, sometimes experiencing a small tax subsidy and sometimes paying a penalty, especially at higher levels of AGI. The same basic pattern emerges in Figure 3 , where married joint filers with two children are examined. However, the marriage penalty for couples with two earners (regardless of the income split) are now larger. This result is particularly notable at low income levels, and is due to the phase-out of the EITC.
A comparison of the marriage penalties resulting from the tax changes resulting from the Bush tax plan versus those that currently exist for these same hypothetical taxpayers yields somewhat surprising results. Changes in the marriage penalty under the Bush proposal are demonstrated in Figures 4 and 5 . Here, a positive number means that the marriage penalty increases under the Bush plan (or that the marriage subsidy decreases); in either case, a positive number means that the Bush proposal would actually reduce the tax benefits of marriage to couples. Conversely, a negative number means that the Bush plan makes married couples better off relative to comparable unmarried couples because the plan either decreases their marriage penalty or increases their marriage subsidy.
For many married taxpayers without children, the tax benefits of marriage decline under the Bush proposal (Figure 4) . Recall that couples with a single earner nearly always receive a marriage subsidy under current tax law. Under the Bush plan, couples who have a single earner would receive a lower tax subsidy under the Bush plan than they do under the current tax law, across most income levels. Consequently, although their total tax liability undeniably falls, their tax position relative to a comparable unmarried couple is worsened. The exception to this is in the income range of roughly $20,000 to $40,000, in which single earner couples would enjoy a small net increase in their marriage subsidy under the Bush plan. In contrast, couples with two equal earners would experience a decrease in their marriage penalty until quite high levels of income. In fact, there is a precipitous increase in the marriage penalty for two equal earners at incomes over the range $190,000 to $300,000, at which point an equally steep downward trend starts. An uneven income split among a two-earner married couple generates a much smaller and generally negative change, so that the Bush plan would often make such households better off compared to current tax law.
The pattern is broadly the same for couples with two children (Figure 5 ). The comparison in this case is with an unmarried couple in which the higher earner claims the children and files as head-ofhousehold, while the partner with the lower earnings files a single return. Now there are spikes of different magnitudes, but, as before, single-earner married families would enjoy a lower marriage subsidy under the Bush proposal than under the current law, and married families with two spouses working would experience a lower marriage penalty up to earnings of over $200,000.
Why does the Bush tax plan actually generate a decrease in the relative tax benefits for some couples and yet increase the tax benefit for others? As emphasized throughout, the key factor is that the Bush plan often gives a larger percentage reduction in the tax liability of single individuals than in the tax liability of married couples, and it is this relative tax treatment that is responsible for the marriage penalty/subsidy. Spikes and troughs are experienced at the points of rate change, where the EITC phases out, where the twoearner deduction ends, and where exemptions and credits are phased out. The changes caused by program phase-outs affect only some couples, mainly those with two earning spouses, those with dependents, and those with high incomes.
Despite the fact that the Bush tax plan does not always deliver the advertised tax relief to all married couples, these effects do not appear overwhelmingly damaging. The largest increases in the marriage penalty are seen only at the very highest end of the income distribution, and thus would affect a relatively small portion of the taxpayers; for example, in 1997 less than 4 percent of joint filers reported AGI of more than $200,000. More troubling is the virtual absence of any real change at the low end of the income distribution, where the EITC phase-out would continue to impose very large marriage penalties, both in terms of absolute magnitude and as a proportion of income.
However, perhaps most surprising is that the reduction in the marriage subsidy among the traditional single-earner families with stay-at-home mothers has not generated any popular response. Admittedly, these families would continue to garner a marriage subsidy. However, the Bush tax plan would unambiguously and often significantly decrease the gains to marriage for these families, a result that seems counter to the family-oriented image favored by President Bush.
Single taxpayers would gain relative to married taxpayers under the Bush tax plan, but they would continue to pay a larger tax bill on identical income. Oneand two-person households with identi-cal income do not have comparable standards of living because of the difference in household size. However, the level of tax adjustment necessary to make them comparable in purchasing power appears to be fairly ad hoc. 4 The difference in taxes paid by a single taxpayer and a married couple with identical earnings could be considered a "singles penalty."
5 Figure 6 shows the singles penalty that would exist with the Bush tax plan, contrasting single taxpayers to married couples with not children, and Figure 7 shows the change in the singles tax under the Bush plan versus the current tax law.
As shown in Figure 7 , the singles penalty generally declines under the President's plan, consistent with the effective narrowing of the difference between married and single taxpayers. At relatively low incomes, the singles penalty increases with income, in part due to the two earner deduction. The singles tax then declines steeply from about $40,000 to $150,000 of AGI, and climbs but remains negative at still higher income levels, so that high-income singles would pay a lower penalty under the Bush plan.
CONCLUSIONS: THE PERSISTENT MARRIAGE (AND SINGLES) PENALTY
It seems obvious that the existence of a marriage (and singles) penalty is an undesirable feature of our tax code. Even aside from the somewhat capricious effects on the equity of the income tax, there is increasing evidence that the marriage penalty distorts decisions in an array of dimensions. 6 The marriage tax may also weaken the family as a basic societal institution, thereby leading to a range of social problems.
If the goal of tax policy is simply to reduce the marriage penalty, then there are a number of piecemeal tax changes that would accomplish this. For example, the adoption of a two-earner deduction with no change in marginal tax rates would reduce the marriage penalty for twoearner couples, and would not alter the marriage subsidy received by singleearner households. An increase in the tax brackets for married couples to double the brackets of single taxpayers would also reduce the marriage penalty. An increase in the standard deduction for married couples (with no corresponding change in the standard deduction for singles and head-of-household filers) would lower the marriage penalty while increasing the marriage subsidy for many couples. Marginal tax rates could be reduced but in different proportions for married, single, and head-of-household filers; if the rates were lowered more for married couples, married couples would experience a reduction in their marriage penalty.
However, these various tax changes would often have other, less benign effects. Doubling of the tax brackets for married couples would increase the marriage subsidy received by many couples, especially those in higher income brackets, and would also increase the relative tax burden on singles and heads-ofhouseholds. Increasing the standard deduction for married couples only would have similar effects, as would reducing marginal tax rates disproportionately for married couples.
7 More generally, our 4 See Alm, Whittington, and Fletcher (forthcoming) for a full discussion of the singles penalty in the federal personal income tax. 5 As Rosen (1977) points out, the strong impetus for the adoption of a separate tax schedule for single taxpayers in the Tax Reform Act of 1969 was the very large penalty incurred by singles relative to married couples with identical income. 6 See Alm, Dickert-Conlin, and Whittington (1999) and Whittington and Alm (forthcoming) for general discussions of the behavioral effects of the marriage tax. 7 It is worth remembering that the marriage penalty only emerged after the Tax Reform Act of 1969, in which a separate rate schedule for single taxpayers was introduced in an attempt to reduce the tax burden on single individuals.
analysis of the Bush tax plan demonstrates that tax reductions motivated at least in part as a way to reduce the marriage penalty can have unintended consequences: the Bush plan would actually exacerbate the marriage penalty for high-income families, would erode the value of the marriage subsidy for many middle-income couples, and would have little effect on the singles tax. In short, the ways in which tax law interacts to affect the tax liabilities of single and married taxpayers is complicated, even if these channels can ultimately be identified and quantified. However, removal of the marriage (and singles) penalty is clearly an achievable goal of tax policy. Perhaps the most transparent approach to the goal of true marriage neutrality is to move to a system of proportional taxation. Alternatively, marriage neutrality could be achieved by defining the unit of taxation as the individual rather than the family. Neither of these fundamental tax reforms seems very likely at present.
